It truly depends on what the question is, what the criteria is, and how the process is structured. It doesn't have to be a 50%+1. It could need 75% support. It could need 40% support. It could need approval of 50%+1 overall vote + 50%+1 provinces/territories. There are many potentials.
You're making it sound like a referendum is a strict "must do it this way" structure... it hardly is.
The Liberals are going want to set the rules to a point where they give their preferred option the best chance to pass.
It seems to me that fundamentally changing how we elect our government should be a constitutional amendment - though I don't know if the electoral process is actually part of the Constitution Acts. But if it is, the referendum would be 50% of the population AND that it passes in at least eight provinces.
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Well now that would depend on what your definition of "real debate" and "real perspectives" are. I see nothing wrong with putting in a system that discourages demagogues and uncivilized discourse.
But that has very little to do with a FPTP; a niche party will likely have no influence in a legislature with FPTP.
Last edited by accord1999; 12-11-2015 at 05:56 PM.
I've been over this before but First Past the Post allows the electorate to truly destroy political parties allowing for renewal at all levels of government. It is a potent weapon in the hand of voters, and that is why so many politicians are so keen to change it.
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A good example would be the forced merger of the wild rose and PCs. They will likely merge before the next election. If you had a second choice system you'd probably still have the PCs in power with no way to ever remove them. Instead the pitiful landscape is reshuffled.
It also requires a certain level of popularity to elect MLAs so fringe parties representing fractions of the electorate don't get elected.
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In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.
"...when he was charming, he was also deeply unserious and frivolous ... when he was apparently serious, he was really quite sinister (as in calling Nazism a form of Protestant heresy and Jews a species of conspicuous foreigner in England); and when he was posing as a theologian, he was doing little more than ventriloquizing John Henry Newman at his most “dogmatic.” For the time and hour in which he lived, “Chestertonianism” came to represent a minor but still important failure to meet a distinct moral challenge."
- Christopher Hitchens
If you're combating the stereotype that you believe "old is good" I wouldn't quote a gifted writer but vapid theologian who died 100 years ago to make your point.
If you're combating the stereotype that you believe "old is good" I wouldn't quote a gifted writer but vapid theologian who died 100 years ago to make your point.
Chesterton wasn't a theologian, but a popular writer. Vapid. Hilarious. And you respond with a quote from Christopher Hitchens. Well, I stand corrected!
The point still stands. Intelligent reformers look at what they are reforming instead of seeking an alternative based on a narrow desire. Often this narrow desire reflects very selfish motives.
The point still stands. Intelligent reformers look at what they are reforming instead of seeking an alternative based on a narrow desire. Often this narrow desire reflects very selfish motives.
I agree. Just giving you a ribbing. Reform for the sake of change is no different (worse, maybe?) than leaving something the way it is just because it's always been that way. Best to discuss frankly the absolute best elements about the thing you want to be rid of, and the absolute worst elements of the thing you're going to replace it with.
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In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.
G.K. Chesterton
I don't think that Chestertons fallacy really applies here. We're all too familiar with why the gate is across the path here; we can see clearly why the system was built the way it was at the time and see its shortcomings. Its great to say that the idea of rejuvenation is better under the FPTP system we have than what we might get under the STV system, or whatever the final proposal looks like. It's hard to know though because we don't know what the proposal will be. I think that there are plenty of examples of parties clinging to power in the FPTP system though, and in various PR systems there are all kinds of compromises and bridge-building that are advantageous as well.
Clearly there is a give and take with any system though. Some will be better for some reasons and not as good for others.
I don't think that Chestertons fallacy really applies here. We're all too familiar with why the gate is across the path here; we can see clearly why the system was built the way it was at the time and see its shortcomings. Its great to say that the idea of rejuvenation is better under the FPTP system we have than what we might get under the STV system, or whatever the final proposal looks like. It's hard to know though because we don't know what the proposal will be. I think that there are plenty of examples of parties clinging to power in the FPTP system though, and in various PR systems there are all kinds of compromises and bridge-building that are advantageous as well.
Clearly there is a give and take with any system though. Some will be better for some reasons and not as good for others.
I've been over this before but First Past the Post allows the electorate to truly destroy political parties allowing for renewal at all levels of government. It is a potent weapon in the hand of voters, and that is why so many politicians are so keen to change it.
That IMO is a weird view, as the countries with First Past the Post have really stagnant political systems with very few parties to choose from. So the theory doesn't seem to describe reality.
Anyway, here's some simple instructional videos on the proposed ideas.
Single Transferable Vote:
And
Mixed-Member Proportional
It's worth noting that there are numerous variations and combinations of both systems, and the article isn't specific enough on the details to actually get an idea how the new system would work. (Or even if the new system is yet specified at a detailed level.)
As for how it would change Canadian politics, simple Liberal domination is actually a really unlikely result.
At the moment, one of the suckiest things to be is a disgruntled minority within a party in a First Past the Post system. First, your chances of being strongly supported as a candidate by your own party are slim because you represent a minority idea. Second, you are actively discouraged from voicing your minority opinions publicly, as internal party warfare is bad party PR, and you don't want to damage your party. (This is especially true if you're generally winning. That's not a time when you want to rock the boat.) Third, you are even more strongly discouraged to run as a candidate for a similar smaller party, as this would only lead to vote splitting and a candidate from a party you totally oppose winning.
In short, First Past the Post tends to create large parties with big differences inside the party. This is a terrible thing for voters, as they have little to choose from and there's a lot of pressure to vote strategically. (Which really should not be a voter concern.)
On the other hand, in a transferable vote system a party is encouraged to run several different candidates at the same time, as that would be likely to draw the maximum amount of voters for their party in general. This means differing opinions inside a party can actually be a good thing, as long as those ideas are not too far off and the differences are presented in a civil manner. This is good for the voters, as they get more options to vote for AND they get to have influence within their party. If the Liberals would continue to dominate, you could still pick which kind of Liberals you like the most.
HOWEVER. A thing the Liberals probably have not considered.
A transferable vote system also incentivizes creating completely new parties that are similar to the large existing parties, and that's most likely done by their own internal minorities. (Who after all are experienced and enthusiastic about politics but have some gripes.)
In a First Past the Post system this could only have lead to disaster (as they would either be left without votes or split the votes badly), but in the proposed new system creating a new party would be "safe" and possibly even somewhat preferable to an overall Liberal agenda (as again Liberal voters would now have more options, and would thus be more likely to vote).
So really, the most likely result IMO would be the Liberals eventually splitting up, or some new party rising "in between" the existing major parties. That's where most the voters are, after all.
As an almost extreme example, if the US had a transferable vote system, the Republicans would very likely have split apart, with the traditional Republicans forming their own party, where they would not be bullied into adopting ultra-conservative stances they hate. They could still be running their own candidates (which they have trouble doing now), giving the more reasonable Republican voters more reasonable options.
The only thing keeping those ideally very different groups together is the First Past the Post system.
Last edited by Itse; 12-12-2015 at 01:01 AM.
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Also:
A transferable vote system would make it almost impossible for extremist groups to rise to power. I think that's something really worth considering in a time when thinly-veiled fascism is gaining popularity in many countries.
You might think it would never happen in Canada, but strange things happen. Most in Finland could never have imagined the kind of violence and xenophobia that's been rising here lately.
Any kind of proportional representation type system makes it easier for extremist or single issue parties to have sway. As they end up forming the balance of power in minority situations.
I don't think the rise of extremism is really a concern in an fptp system if campaign finance laws are reasonable.
I've said it before, and will say it again. Ban political parties. That solves nearly all of the problems.
How do you vote then?
I want to vote on an economic, social and tax plan. Requiring every candidate to have their own well costed plan seems like a nightmare. Then you elect your local representitives and now they have to select a prime minister by comparing these plans, finding simiar ones.
In the matter of reforming things, as distinct from deforming them, there is one plain and simple principle; a principle which will probably be called a paradox. There exists in such a case a certain institution or law; let us say, for the sake of simplicity, a fence or gate erected across a road. The more modern type of reformer goes gaily up to it and says, “I don’t see the use of this; let us clear it away.” To which the more intelligent type of reformer will do well to answer: “If you don’t see the use of it, I certainly won’t let you clear it away. Go away and think. Then, when you can come back and tell me that you do see the use of it, I may allow you to destroy it.
G.K. Chesterton
I was just messing with you, but honestly, a callback to Chesterton couldn't have been more apropos to what I was saying.
We're a country of 30 million people in a communications era where results are available across the country in real-time.
We need contemporary solutions to issues which impact democracy directly in the here and now.
Questions that weren't able to be asked 100 years ago now need answers. The limitations of FPTP are unclouded:
Quote:
It excludes smaller parties from ‘fair’ representation, in the sense that a party which wins approximately, say, 10 per cent of the votes should win approximately 10 per cent of the legislative seats. In the 1993 federal election in Canada, the Progressive Conservatives won 16 per cent of the votes but only 0.7 per cent of the seats, and in the 1998 general election in Lesotho, the Basotho National Party won 24 per cent of the votes but only 1 per cent of the seats. This is a pattern which is repeated time and time again under FPTP.
It excludes minorities from fair representation. As a rule, under FPTP, parties put up the most broadly acceptable candidate in a particular district so as to avoid alienating the majority of electors. Thus it is rare, for example, for a black candidate to be given a major party’s nomination in a majority white district in the UK or the USA, and there is strong evidence that ethnic and racial minorities across the world are far less likely to be represented in legislatures elected by FPTP. In consequence, if voting behaviour does dovetail with ethnic divisions, then the exclusion from representation of members of ethnic minority groups can be destabilizing for the political system as a whole.
It excludes women from the legislature. The ‘most broadly acceptable candidate’ syndrome also affects the ability of women to be elected to legislative office because they are often less likely to be selected as candidates by male-dominated party structures. Although the evidence across the world suggests that women are less likely to be elected to the legislature under plurality/majority systems than under PR ones, some variation resulting of data from two studies by the Inter-Parlamentary Union (IPU) in 2004 and 2013 is worth mentioning: whereas women had representation to 15.6% of the seats of the low chambers in the different parliaments in 2004, this percentage amounts to 20.1% by 2012. Moreover, and here is where we find the most representative variation, a comparison made in 2004 in established democracies showed that the average of women in the legislatures of countries with majority systems was 14.4%, while the quantity increased to 27.6% in countries with proportional systems, almost the double; in this same comparison made in 2012, the gap decreases slightly as the average of women in legislatures with majority system is 14% and 25% in proportional systems. In part, this may be explained by the implementation of policies that have regulated or promoted gender equity within countries, such as having a certain amount of seats reserved for women.
It can encourage the development of political parties based on clan, ethnicity or region, which may base their campaigns and policy platforms on conceptions that are attractive to the majority of people in their district or region but exclude or are hostile to others. This has been an ongoing problem in African countries like Malawi and Kenya, where large communal groups tend to be regionally concentrated. The country is thus divided into geographically separate party strongholds, with little incentive for parties to make appeals outside their home region and cultural–political base.
It exaggerates the phenomenon of ‘regional fiefdoms’ where one party wins all the seats in a province or area. If a party has strong support in a particular part of a country, winning a plurality of votes, it will win all, or nearly all, of the seats in the legislature for that area. This both excludes minorities in that area from representation and reinforces the perception that politics is a battleground defined by who you are and where you live rather than what you believe in. This has long been put forward as an argument against FPTP in Canada.
It leaves a large number of wasted votes which do not go towards the election of any candidate. This can be particularly dangerous if combined with regional fiefdoms, because minority party supporters in the region may begin to feel that they have no realistic hope of ever electing a candidate of their choice. It can also be dangerous where alienation from the political system increases the likelihood that extremists will be able to mobilize anti-system movements.
It can cause vote-splitting. Where two similar parties or candidates compete under FPTP, the vote of their potential supporters is often split between them, thus allowing a less popular party or candidate to win the seat. Papua New Guinea provides a particularly clear example.
It may be unresponsive to changes in public opinion. A pattern of geographically concentrated electoral support in a country means that one party can maintain exclusive executive control in the face of a substantial drop in overall popular support. In some democracies under FPTP, a fall from 60 per cent to 40 per cent of a party’s share of the popular vote nationally can result in a fall from 80 per cent to 60 per cent in the number of seats held, which does not affect its overall dominant position. Unless sufficient seats are highly competitive, the system can be insensitive to swings in public opinion.
Finally, FPTP systems are dependent on the drawing of electoral boundaries. All electoral boundaries have political consequences: there is no technical process to produce a single ‘correct answer’ independently of political or other considerations. Boundary delimitation may require substantial time and resources if the results are to be accepted as legitimate. There may also be pressure to manipulate boundaries by gerrymandering or malapportionment. This was particularly apparent in the Kenyan elections of 1993 when huge disparities between the sizes of electoral districts—the largest had 23 times the number of voters the smallest had—contributed to the ruling Kenyan African National Union party’s winning a large majority in the legislature with only 30 per cent of the popular vote.
I think all of the above criticisms of FPTP are representative in Canadian politics.
Arguably, the largest obstacle towards political progress in this country is the regionalism represented by the 3-4 major political parties. It is an ongoing, objective issue in Canadian politics exacerbated by FPTP.
This forum is a means of public debate, so let's have a real public debate without appealing to whispers in the wind from nearly a century ago.
FPTP has served us well and has ensured that Canadians elect centrist, middle of the road governments with strong mandates to implement their policy vision. It has it's obvious drawbacks, however I'm not sure that the alternatives are any better.
Having said that, I would be in favour of reforming the senate into a proportionally elected or hybrid body, but not the Commons.
FPTP has served us well and has ensured that Canadians elect centrist, middle of the road governments with strong mandates to implement their policy vision. It has it's obvious drawbacks, however I'm not sure that the alternatives are any better.
Having said that, I would be in favour of reforming the senate into a proportionally elected or hybrid body, but not the Commons.
I'm not terribly familiar with this perspective on the Commons, can you expand a bit?
FPTP allowed the Liberals to form majority governments in the Chretien years and (it was thought) the Conservatives would form majority governments for the same reason in the recent past. It was an election promise, but it's obvious that a party that came to power under a particular system isn't going to be too keen to change it.
I would be very surprised if after all the consultation we didn't end up with a recommendation of keep it as it is, but if there is a recommended change, you can bet it will NOT be proportional representation, which pretty much guarantees minority governments forever, and may allow fringe parties to hold the balance of power.
Under representation of small parties -- is a pro keeps extremist views out
Ethnic Minorities -- this also assures areas with ethnic minorities are elected in their areas. In Canada I think this is a pro as it ensures native representation in native dominated areas and other ethnic representation in various majority areas.
Women -- if you note the end of the statement is that it is influenced by pro equality policies in areas with pr. I think you need to look into more detail before saying this is a defect of Ftfp. And it's likely you could develop policies to get more equal participation such as appointments by the parties in charge of mandatory quotas for major parties if this is a priority.
Regional/Racial fiefdoms -- outside of Alberta every other region in Canada is effective at regularly switching allegiances in between national and regional parties. This appears to be a defect in Albertans rather than the system. It is an item to watch though but in Canada it appears that with party renewal the regional parties lose support or moderate to appeal nationally with constituents desire to form government.
Wasted Votes -- not an issue. Disagree that it leads to anti system candidates. No evidence of this being an issue over 100 years in Alberta
Vote Splitting -- again I see this as a feature it discourages large numbers of similar parties and leads to renewal .
Unresponsive to sways in opinion -- this is also a feature. Stability in government amoung small swings in opinion is a good thing.
Boundaries-- agree with this being a significant issue but Canada handles it well.
The initial posted list contains a lot of criticisms of FTFP which are still present in the ranked ballot that is loosely proposed. The only items which are addressed are wasted votes and vote splitting. Both of which aren't significant enough to change a system.
The discussion of PR vs FTFP at least is more interesting then the ranked ballot.
