Australian special forces allegedly killed 39 unarmed Afghans: report
Quote:
While the report was heavily redacted, it included allegations that senior special forces personnel ordered the killing of unarmed Afghans.
“There is credible information that junior soldiers were required by their patrol commanders to shoot a prisoner, in order to achieve the soldier’s first kill, in a practice that was known as ‘blooding’,” the report read.
Once a person had been killed, those allegedly responsible would stage a fight scene with foreign weapons or equipment to justify their action, the report concluded.
The purpose of ordering the junior soldiers to execute someone to achieve "their first kill" is to ensure that everyone has mutually compromising information on one another. Like the mafia, but they call it a brotherhood. First war crime, first hit of meth, and you have bound that troop to the team.
obtained at the Ardenne Abbey (a cloth poppy, not the usual kind) where some 28 Canadians were slaughtered by the Germans.
When were you there, and what shape was the Abbey in? I visited in 2000 and the Abbey itself looked like nothing had been meaningfully altered in 56 years. I spoke with a resident/Abbey neighbour who said there were plans in the works to refurbish the space into a kind of community hall and likely plaster over all the bullet holes and other superficial war damage.
When were you there, and what shape was the Abbey in? I visited in 2000 and the Abbey itself looked like nothing had been meaningfully altered in 56 years. I spoke with a resident/Abbey neighbour who said there were plans in the works to refurbish the space into a kind of community hall and likely plaster over all the bullet holes and other superficial war damage.
About four years ago. It hadn’t been refurbished and was just a little park with a small memorial. Bullet holes were still there. I hope they leave it intact.
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I don't know how to comment on the news of the atrocities in the field. We seen it through the history of warfare on all side, and that doesn't excuse it. In the past it was written off as the cost of war, or part of the psychological warfare package. Or even the result of poorly lead and trained soldiers.
I believe that one thing that has to happen to fix is is better mental health support for the soldiers in the field. And also far better training of NCO's and officers, and breaking the wheel of the concept of band of brother hood when it comes to how to report these actions.
At the same time, the civil authority needs to take some responsibility and maybe the military justice system has to be blended with the civilian justice system, murder is murder, and soldiers can't cover for the institutions that they belong to.
Killing civilians is a tragic, and its an unfortunate side effect of war. Its impossible to believe that there's any way of avoiding it, even with the best precision guided munitions. However the intentional targeting of civilians or the breeding of terror among civilians is unforgivable.
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USA Rep Jack Murtha (a former Marine) accused the Pentagon of covering up Haditha. Murtha received all kinds of ridicule from other members of Congress and it just highlights that there are powerful people that are able to influence others into effecting cover ups so as to protect their reputations, etc.
With regards to the previously mentioned Australian SAS allegations, the whistle blower (Capt David Mcbride) was charged. He has pleaded not guilty and is waiting trial.
And then you have President Trump pardoning a war criminal.
My point: these guys know they can get away with it.
Surely, there are those that make the argument that these "are just a few bad apples", or that they are "isolated incidents". But I don't buy that. It's systemic, institutionalized normalization of war crimes that includes deliberate methodologies, and standard operating procedures used to commit the crimes and cover them up.
This Brereton report and The Age article appears spot on in regard to the rot with SOF and how it has spread and perpetuated itself.
For example, it is known in certain circles how and why Australian SAS operators began carrying hatchets on target. This article makes reference to the SOF culture of hero worship. SAS operators did exchanges with DEVGRU (DEVelopment GRoUp aka SEAL Team Six) and saw them carrying Dan Winkler hatchets, which are used for war crimes. Monkey see, monkey do. Guess what Aussie SAS guys are now carrying around in Afghanistan?
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I believe that one thing that has to happen to fix is is better mental health support for the soldiers in the field. And also far better training of NCO's and officers, and breaking the wheel of the concept of band of brother hood when it comes to how to report these actions.
I agree. But here's the problem, especially as it pertains to USA SOF:
The screening for admittance to the SOF world generally works. They're good guys when they get in. But, five, six, seven, eight, ten, 15 deployments later, it is another story. They could do continuous screening, but if command made everyone with PTSD/TBI stand down for treatment, these units could not deploy. This is an important aspect of the conversation about SOF units committing war crimes. Selection works, but the units fail these guys. Can you even imagine commanders telling higher that they are non-deployable because of mental health issues? That will never happen.
It's really, really easy to start dehumanizing the enemy after a few tours, and it's really easy to dehumanize them after they've killed several of your friends. Obviously, there's no excuse for killing for sport, but it's gotta be tough to reign it in as an operator of that ilk.
But, it has to stop. A country can’t ask the same volunteers to fight these wars disconnected from the political will and manpower of the nation. If we don’t have that, maybe it’s time to stop fighting. It's a complex issue for sure, but the politicians are failing these men and their families.
Look at the resistance Trump receives when he wants to withdraw troops from Afghanistan. "Premature" they say. FFS, it's into the 20th year now. There's nothing premature about it.
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I think you've tripped onto something that could change.
The multiple number of deployments in a row, I agree with you on that and the difficulty of standing units down.
But how about limiting deployments in a row, wouldn't it benefit to get these guys with 2 or 3 deployments out of the field and into training, whether with a regular unit or in terms of training more operators.
Give them a break, I know these guys are high octane and high test, but if you leave them in the jungle for too long, somethings going to break, or they're going to lose their humanity.
I completely agree with you that the senior top level leadership is failing badly, and the political leadership is even worse and more demanding of results beyond cost.
I've also been reading a lot of papers in terms of re-integration of soldiers leaving the service and heading back into the normal world, and not near enough is being done for them, The one day you're a soldier and the next your not aspect has to really change. I hate to liken it to parole, but there are some aspects of support that need to be given during the transition that's not happening now to our regret.
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I don't know how to comment on the news of the atrocities in the field. We seen it through the history of warfare on all side, and that doesn't excuse it. In the past it was written off as the cost of war, or part of the psychological warfare package. Or even the result of poorly lead and trained soldiers.
I believe that one thing that has to happen to fix is is better mental health support for the soldiers in the field. And also far better training of NCO's and officers, and breaking the wheel of the concept of band of brother hood when it comes to how to report these actions.
At the same time, the civil authority needs to take some responsibility and maybe the military justice system has to be blended with the civilian justice system, murder is murder, and soldiers can't cover for the institutions that they belong to.
Killing civilians is a tragic, and its an unfortunate side effect of war. Its impossible to believe that there's any way of avoiding it, even with the best precision guided munitions. However the intentional targeting of civilians or the breeding of terror among civilians is unforgivable.
IMO such incidents should be prosecuted, and mental health, fog of war, etc. can be part of the defence. It should not simply be excused as stuff happens, even though stuff always happens in war.
The Desert War was unlike any other campaign in WW2. The Italians attacked the British, The British routed the Italians. The Germans and Italians pushed the British back, the British pushed the Germans and Italians back. The Germans and Italians almost routed the British, the British, Australians, Indians, South Africans and New Zealanders routed the Germans and Italians. All on one road, 2800 km long. Imagine fighting a running battle along Highway 1 from Calgary to Sudbury. It finally ended after the Americans and British invaded by sea, but not before the Americans almost got pushed back into it.
The result didn’t have a major impact on the war but was the first substantial Allied victory over Germany alongside Stalingrad.
Strategic Importance
As it turns out, much less than it could have had. There was a debate amongst the German leadership at the time and among post-war scholars that a stronger Axis push could have driven the British out of Egypt and the Middle East, taken over the oil supply, and seized full control of the Mediterranean. In addition to removing one supply line for Russia it would likely force Turkey to acquiesce to the Germans and give them a more direct route to Russia’s oil fields. Some estimate this could have been a war-winning strategy.
The Allies, on the other hand, saw North Africa as a gateway to Italy and the ‘soft under-belly of Europe’. While it did eventually lead them to Italy, the soft under-belly turned out to be all sinew and gristle and the Allied forces only managed to advance out of Italy as the war was ending. It could be argued that this tied up valuable German resources that could have been used elsewhere, but still it wasn’t a master strategic stroke.
The Combatants
Italy started the whole adventure from their Libyan colony. Mussolini wanted to take over Egypt and assembled a large force to do so. Unfortunately, the Italian army was poorly led and poorly equipped, and through much of the North African campaign served as a boat anchor and cannon fodder for the German ambitions. The lop-sidedness of some of the battles left the Italian solider with an undeserved reputation for ineffectiveness and cowardice. Most modern observers suggest they fought hard but were undone by leadership and equipment. A particular handicap in this mobile battle was the obsolescence of their tank force. The Italian navy had a significant presence in the Mediterranean including a number of battleships and was tasked with keeping supply lanes open. The Italian air force, while not on par with the Germans or British, was available for support.
The Germans were reluctant participants. Once the decision was made not to make a strategic thrust into the Middle East they only joined after the humiliating defeat of the Italians by a much smaller British force. Hitler committed a small force of a few panzer divisions to stabilize the front. The Afrika Korps were experienced soldiers and well-equipped with the latest Panzer III’s and IV’s and the 88mm anti-aircraft gun that made its name as a tank-killer in this campaign. It’s important to note that these forces were fully motorized, unlike most German divisions that still used significant numbers of horses to pull equipment (yes, look it up!). The German air force was at times a factor but its availability varied depending on other engagements in Europe.
The British had a strong presence in Egypt and East Africa as well as a crucial presence on the island of Malta which would have an out-sized impact on the outcome. Their troops had some battle experience from Norway and France, and were supplemented over time by soldiers from various Commonwealth nations excluding Canada which was building up for action in France. The British tanks were inferior to the German’s and reflected their out-dated thinking about the role of armour. The Matilda ‘infantry tank’ was almost impervious to anti-tank fire but was slow as molasses and armed with a pop-gun. The various marks of ‘cruiser tanks’ were faster but thinly armoured and armed with slightly better guns. Later they fielded larger numbers of American Grant and Sherman tanks which while not perfect were a significant upgrade. The British had good air support from bases in Egypt and Malta, the latter to interdict vital shipping lanes for Axis material. The Royal Navy also played a big role in the supply war with destroyers and submarines disrupting Axis convoys.
The US and Free French took part in the final stage of the campaign with the Torch landings in Tunisia. The green Americans took a beating at Kasserine Pass, which pointed out deficiencies in tactics and equipment and planted a deep respect for German fighting power in the minds of Eisenhower and Patton. The experience gained there not doubt played a part in future battles.
The Generals
There were many Generals engaged on both sides, but excluding Eisenhower and Patton whose fame would come later, the two most famous and who made their reputations in Africa were Erwin Rommel and Bernard Montgomery.
Rommel, “the Desert Fox’, demonstrated his daring and understanding of mobile warfare as a panzer division commander in France where he routinely stretched or ignored orders in order to seize the initiative. While not a fervent Nazi, he was well-liked by Hitler which likely helped him get away with his routine insubordination. The fact that he was wildly successful no doubt helped too. The same pattern repeated itself in North Africa where an order to stay on the defensive turned into ‘reconnaissance’ which was his code for a full-on assault, because he saw an opening. Throughout the campaign he demonstrated a keen understanding of mobile warfare and the North African theatre gave him a unique environment to execute it. I think the best summary of his approach to war was not to wait until his side was ready, but to attack before the other side was ready.
My biggest criticism of Rommel relates to the same aggressive risk-taking that made him successful. While he rarely had a tactical risk blow up on him, where did it get him in the end? He chased the British almost to Cairo but in the end his forces were completely spent and unable to withstand the inevitable build-up of forces opposing him. The North African campaign is one that he really couldn’t have won, but in the end, opened up an avenue for the Allies to invade Italy. Would he have been better just defending the southern flank of the Reich?
Since the war there has been debate about his culpability for war crimes and prisoner mistreatment that occurred in regions under his command in France and North Africa. He wasn’t conclusively implicated, and was generally admired by his opponents as a chivalrous warrior who ‘fought war without hate’, but as with most history we’re not sure where the truth lies.
‘Monty’ came to the conflict later, once the final Axis advance petered out at El Alamein. He was a larger than life figure in the British army, frequently in trouble for speaking truth to power, and was given command of the Eighth army after the intended new commander was killed. By most accounts he had an immediate impact on the preparation and morale of the troops and set about beefing up defenses, including for a predicted German offensive at Alam el Halfa which did in fact happen and was repulsed. Montgomery was very methodical and, while supremely confident, conservative about acting until all preparations were complete. At Alam el Halfa he had the opportunity to counter-attack and potentially trap the Axis forces but chose to conserve his troops for the bigger battle yet to come. His signature victory in the second Battle of El Alamein 2 was based on meticulous preparation, overwhelming force superiority, and stubborn adherence to the plan until victory. This couldn’t be more different than Rommel’s approach. Both generals have their detractors, Montgomery more than Rommel, but in his defense, he was a winner and it’s hard to argue with that.
The Challenges
The African theatre posed challenges unlike any others the combatants were used to. The environment was unforgiving – blistering hot by day, cold by night, sand and dust everywhere, and little cover. Sandstorms were major issues, dust affected equipment, and the plumes of dust sent up from moving vehicles limited the element of surprise. The battle was fought along the northern coast of Africa where there was literally only one highway – again imagine fighting across Canada just on Highway 1. To one side was the sea, to the other either mobility-limiting sand or impassable salt marshes. There was, though, an abundance of space for those who were willing and able to use it to their advantage.
Supply lines were the biggest challenge and ultimately what doomed the Axis forces. Tripoli was the main Axis port, Alexandria was the main British port. With 2200 km between them it meant that one side or other was operating on a very tenuous supply line. The closer the Germans got to Alexandria the longer their supply line became and the easier it was for the Allies to resupply. Even the fuel required to run the longer truck convoys became a significant factor let alone the sheer number of trucks required. Again, it’s worth noting that the German army as a whole was not highly motorized apart from the panzer divisions so trucks were always at a premium. It was estimated that 40 round-trip convoys of 30 trucks each were required every week for proper supply – something that rarely happened. Before the campaign the Germans estimated that four strong divisions would be enough to take Egypt and that was also the supply limit. Instead Panzerarmee Afrika consisted of 2 ½ German and multiple weaker Italian divisions so supply shortages were a constant battle. Both sides made use of smaller ports at Benghazi and Tobruk, depending who controlled them at the time, but the coastal shipping required to supply them was easily harassed from air and sea.
A bigger issue for the Axis was getting supplies to Tripoli in the first place. The British could resupply Alexandria through the safety of the Suez Canal but German and Italian supplies needed to run the gauntlet of the Mediterranean. Vast quantities of equipment and fuel were sunk by British naval and air forces based out of Malta despite the Italian navy expending significant resources to escort convoys. Ultimately this led to the downfall of the Axis army.
The Malta Question
Malta is a tiny group of islands 80 km off the coast of Sicily which the British turned into a fortress during the war. From there they could control the direct shipping lanes between Italy and North Africa forcing the Axis to absorb significant shipping losses and/or take circuitous supply routes. The island took a tremendous pounding during the war but maintained a vital British presence in the Mediterranean. Whether or not to invade Malta was and remains a key question that shaped the outcome of the conflict.
Plans were drawn up for an aerial and marine invasion but Hitler and others were concerned about it due to the heavy losses taken by German parachute and glider troops in the earlier assault on Crete and had a lack of confidence in the Italian navy to secure the waters and land forces. In the months leading up to the invasion Rommel’s forces made tremendous gains and were poised to take Alexandria so the plan was cancelled. In hindsight it’s clear that this supply impediment had to be removed for the Axis to stand a chance of victory.
The Tactics
The Desert War has often been compared to a sea battle. There were relatively few forces operating in large spaces so the ability manoeuvre around and between the enemy despite the lack of roads was key. Defensive lines could only be maintained at certain bottlenecks such as El Alamein where there was a pinch between the sea and the cliffs of the Qattara depression. The Italians tended to use hedgehog defenses with a series of armed camps spread over an area, but the British were able to exploit the gaps between them and attack individually.
Rommel’s go to tactic was a wide flanking manoeuvre through the desert to come at the enemy from behind. While this often worked, sometimes it didn’t such as at the battle of Alam el Halfa where the British were waiting for it. The Germans were also good at setting anti-tank traps where they would attack then retreat, drawing the Allied armour into a hail storm of 88mm anti-tank fire. The American forces had their baptism of fire in such a trap.
The supply situation also played into tactics. If one could take the highway behind the enemy then their only supply line would be cut. The early British victories exploited this to overrun vastly superior number of Italian troops.
The closest the armies came to traditional tactics was at the second Battle of El Alamein. There the two armies dug in and resupplied for the decisive battle of the campaign, which Montgomery executed in his trademark set-piece style with massed barrages and days of attrition before breaking through and starting the chase to Tunisia.
Deception and Espionage
A whole article could be written on this subject for the war as a whole, but as an aside here are a few examples in the Desert War. The Allies built up overwhelming force superiority prior to El Alamein 2, but still wanted to keep the Axis off-guard as to where they would strike. They covered their massed artillery pieces with camouflage netting. Then they setup poles covered in camo netting to look like artillery. Then they setup poles badly covered in camo netting to look like fake artillery. They set up a graveyard of ‘abandoned’ vehicles which was actually a staging area for the attack. They made sure the Germans got hold of make maps that incorrectly marked areas of quicksand and other obstacles.
Both sides had access to the others’ private communications – the Germans through insecure communications by American officials in Egypt, and the British through ULTRA which had been captured unbeknownst to the Germans. Rommel was kept informed of British resupply schedules and several of his decisions were made based on striking before they arrived. Ironically the success of the first German offensive was due in part to the surprise of Rommel not following orders to stay put, orders that the British had intercepted.
At a critical point in the campaign the Germans were desperate for replacement tanks and rather than risk trying to get a convoy through decided to send four ships on solo voyages over different routes to sneak through. The British learned of this via ULTRA but then faced a dilemma. If they intercepted these specific ships on these specific routes then the Germans would surely know that their codes were compromised. On the other hand, if they did nothing the new equipment might just turn the tide before the bulk of the British reinforcements arrived. In the end they did sink all four ships but used their well-established disinformation network to blame a known German spy for leaking the information.
The Battles
I think I’ve written a book before getting to the actual fighting, so I’ll just give an overview and leave topics for others to dive deeper on.
September 1940: The Italian army invades Egypt from Libya
December 1940-February 1941: The British counterattack, and despite being massively outnumbered drive the Italian army back into Libya, capturing 100,000+ prisoners. Shortly after this stunning victory significant numbers of British troops are transferred to Greece to defend against the German invasion there
February 1941: Rommel and the Afrika Korps arrive in Libya
March-November 1941: The Axis forces invade Egypt and lay siege to Commonwealth forces trapped in Tobruk. Several British counter-offensives fail
December 1941: Tobruk relieved and Axis forces retreat back to Libya where they started in March
January-July 1942: The second Axis offensive takes them all the way to El Alamein, a mere 110 km from Alexandria where British officials begin burning sensitive papers. The offensive grinds to a halt in the face of stiff resistance and almost complete exhaustion of resources – the Germans were down to around 40 working tanks.
August 1942: Montgomery assumes command and successfully repulses Rommel’s attack at the battle of Alam el Halfa.
October-November 1942: The decisive second Battle of El Alamein rages for two weeks before the Axis lines are broken. A combined American/British/French force land in Morocco in Operation Torch
November 1942-February 1943: The Panzerarmee Afrika is chased through Egypt and Libya to Tunisia
February-March 1943: Rommel’s reinforced forces push back against the Americans and British in Tunisia, achieving a tactical victory against the inexperienced American units at Kasserine Pass.
March-May 1943: The Axis forces are defeated, more than 250,000 are taken prisoner, the rest escape to Sicily
Here is an animated summary of the campaign:
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This is awesome work, and I really enjoyed it, I did love the African campaigns. The misery of fighting in that environment was another key factor, Tanks had major over heating problems and crew exhaustion was a factor as well.
I'm tempted to move the Battle of Stalingrad writeup to mid week, since this is a really good writeup.
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This is awesome work, and I really enjoyed it, I did love the African campaigns. The misery of fighting in that environment was another key factor, Tanks had major over heating problems and crew exhaustion was a factor as well.
I'm tempted to move the Battle of Stalingrad writeup to mid week, since this is a really good writeup.
Thanks Captain. It was fun!
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Just one point of contention, in 1941, the Matilda II's two-pounder AT gun was still pretty good and could penetrate the armour of most German and all Italian tanks at mid-range. It's really drawback was the lack of an HE round (which did exist but wasn't shipped in decent amounts to crews, and also, being two pounds wasn't very effective against hard targets), limiting is use for infantry support to laying down smoke rounds to cover infantry advance
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Great write up. North Africa might not have been seen as a campaign of major significance but it was important for a few reasons. It was the first major effort by US land forces in the European theatre, was the first amphibious landing by US forces in the European theatre, and was the first airborne landings as well. All important precursors for later efforts by the Allies.
Great write up. North Africa might not have been seen as a campaign of major significance but it was important for a few reasons. It was the first major effort by US land forces in the European theatre, was the first amphibious landing by US forces in the European theatre, and was the first airborne landings as well. All important precursors for later efforts by the Allies.
The North African campaign is woefully underrated. In terms of a victory for the Allies, it should stand alongside Stalingrad.
EDIT: Working on a write-up on the Canadians in NW Europe. Hope to be done today.
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