Voting should be required at least once every 10 years for municipal, provincial, Federal or you risk fines. With electronic voting there's really no excuse not to be able to get around to voting every 3rd vote or so.
The ability to vote but also voice displeasure. A check box you could tick while voting normally to insinuate you've voted normally, but you don't like any of the candidates. I've been curious how many actually liked Notley's NDP and how much of it was purely protest vote. It's essentially an approval rating built into the ballot. An abstain + displeasure tick box option could be a stronger voice against being upset with government.
You could go as far as do round 2 voting for the top 2 candidates for areas which have an incumbent take less than 50% of votes AND over than 50% displeasure ratings.
A better unified website for voting details. Though, I'm not sure if this is a democratic responsibility vs perhaps the responsibility of a 3rd party group. This website for instance could either have an independent group vet information to limit smear campaigns as well as vet the accuracy of information during the campaigns.
Before people instantly dismiss this please consider this argument in its entirety. I understand this would be very hard to enact politically. Also keep in mind this is the END goal, the implementation on how to transition would not be able to happen overnight and would likely take upwards of a decade to properly implement. Likely it would have to be tested in one area / industry / sector before the idea is applied to all regulatory bodies.
The basic premise would be that the government would no longer have ANY regulations with the one stipulation that every company that operates in the sector that previously had regulation would be required by law to hold an insurance policy that covers the damages for the actions of that company with regards to the sector being "regulated". If a company was found operating in a sector / industry without a proper policy they would have the power to shut down their operation like any normal regulatory body, this would be the governments sole regulatory responsibility.
Example: An insurance companies would be required to foot the bill if a pipeline company had a spill to cover the damages and reclamation costs.
Since NO insurance companies would ever allow their clients to operate in a completely unregulated fashion they would adopt their own "regulations" to ensure that the companies premiums do not exceed their possible damages. The insurance companies would then be able to tailor their internal regulations and tie them to actualities of damages caused by the industry / sector.
Companies would still be required to be regulated however it would be controlled by the free market of what actually causes damages. Insurance companies want to make money so they would want their clients to operate in the most ethical fashion to limit any potential damages. Companies will want to enact ethical practices because it will lower their premiums and help their bottom line.
The goal of this is to decouple regulation from partisan policy and couple it to statistically measurable actualities. Private companies are able to react faster than government bodies.
The government would close the regulatory body being replaced and give its operating cost in the form of tax breaks to the coffers. (So they can pay for the insurance)
This takes the regulatory cost burden off companies and people not involved in that sector / industry and makes only those who operate in it to assume the burdens of their actions.
I think the only way you could start a transition to this model would be an initial requirement of the insurance companies is to adopt ALL existing regulations for X period of time in which they can tune their business model to more accurately reflect what is important to regulate in the industry and what is "leftover" regulations that still exist but are no longer relevant.
I'm open to any constructive criticism of the idea.
I'm sure all the people posting in the "Layoffs in the oil patch" thread appreciate your sympathy.
I've at points in my life delivered pizza for $100 a night in between well paying sales jobs to keep afloat.
My father was a highly paid and respected engineer and worked at the lumber yard at Totem and renovated basements and bathrooms during the crash in the early 80's to provide for us once his EI was up. He went from riding the Suncor Jet, to loading 2x4's into pickups and fixing toilets.
So yes. There is always a way once the EI expires. It might not be glamorous, but some people will do whatever it takes.
Just because there are problematic concerns as of now, does not mean we cannot make it more reliable in the future. I'm not necessarily saying run out and grab whatever is on the market. Some options work and are implemented by other countries. Fine tuning one could work.
Personally, I think a verification system is the biggest hurdle. In our current system, we have a box full of paper. In an electronic, no such thing. Yes there are concerns, but refusing the idea of e-voting because of those concerns and not actively looking for a solution that works long term is IMO a dumb idea.
OT, that guy's head in the video looks like a semi squashed Boumeester.
Before people instantly dismiss this please consider this argument in its entirety. I understand this would be very hard to enact politically. Also keep in mind this is the END goal, the implementation on how to transition would not be able to happen overnight and would likely take upwards of a decade to properly implement. Likely it would have to be tested in one area / industry / sector before the idea is applied to all regulatory bodies.
The basic premise would be that the government would no longer have ANY regulations with the one stipulation that every company that operates in the sector that previously had regulation would be required by law to hold an insurance policy that covers the damages for the actions of that company with regards to the sector being "regulated". If a company was found operating in a sector / industry without a proper policy they would have the power to shut down their operation like any normal regulatory body, this would be the governments sole regulatory responsibility.
Example: An insurance companies would be required to foot the bill if a pipeline company had a spill to cover the damages and reclamation costs.
Since NO insurance companies would ever allow their clients to operate in a completely unregulated fashion they would adopt their own "regulations" to ensure that the companies premiums do not exceed their possible damages. The insurance companies would then be able to tailor their internal regulations and tie them to actualities of damages caused by the industry / sector.
Companies would still be required to be regulated however it would be controlled by the free market of what actually causes damages. Insurance companies want to make money so they would want their clients to operate in the most ethical fashion to limit any potential damages. Companies will want to enact ethical practices because it will lower their premiums and help their bottom line.
The goal of this is to decouple regulation from partisan policy and couple it to statistically measurable actualities. Private companies are able to react faster than government bodies.
The government would close the regulatory body being replaced and give its operating cost in the form of tax breaks to the coffers. (So they can pay for the insurance)
This takes the regulatory cost burden off companies and people not involved in that sector / industry and makes only those who operate in it to assume the burdens of their actions.
I think the only way you could start a transition to this model would be an initial requirement of the insurance companies is to adopt ALL existing regulations for X period of time in which they can tune their business model to more accurately reflect what is important to regulate in the industry and what is "leftover" regulations that still exist but are no longer relevant.
I'm open to any constructive criticism of the idea.
I think the big problem with this (and really most economic theories) is the human element. And that it starts to break down when it gets applied to entities that are economically massive.
So what now decides what is an appropriate punishment for unethical or dangerous business practices? Currently companies that commit fraud or pollute the environment receive what look like high value punishments (in the dozens and up to hundreds of millions of dollars) but are pretty unsubstantial when taking their profits into account. As long as pure profit is the sole motivator for a business, they will seek too (and in many ways are legally obligated to) maximize profit. That means if the punishment for shirking regulations is x, but the profits for doing something unsafely or whatever vs having routine checks is 2x, or even 1.000000001x, a company will choose the latter every time.
So the question is, would self-regulated insurance seek to punish these companies as harshly as necessary to curb the behavior? IMO the answer is no for the same reason as above. Those insurance companies are for profit business, and they make money by maximizing clients. They gain nothing by pricing people out of their plans or into bankruptcy. There is the same equation for them, is paying out the damages by company y less than the premiums I get from them and all others? Can I keep company y as a client and slightly raise premiums on everyone else without much of a fuss?
Maybe there would be some type of recourse the other businesses could take against someone needlessly raising premiums. But another problem with these types of free markets, as we are seeing now, some companies end up becoming giants and entire industries end up run by two or three companies. That would include the insurance industry here and end up with a scenario (not dissimilar to now) where premiums are largely the same across the board for similar plans and even discount brokers are actually run by the larger entities.
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The electronic voting thing intrigues me. I'm not sure I could ever be comfortable that it was secure or even being counted.
But if voting was done via smartphone app, it would be a revolutionary change in voter turnout.
It definitely would, but I remain skeptical on whether or not it's a good idea. It would open the door to 'trolling' votes, or people voting for the sake of voting with no knowledge of the candidates. Sure, people can technically do that now, but I like to think that people who take the time to go to a polling station and in some cases wait in line to vote have actually done a little research on the candidates and are invested in the outcome.
It definitely would, but I remain skeptical on whether or not it's a good idea. It would open the door to 'trolling' votes, or people voting for the sake of voting with no knowledge of the candidates. Sure, people can technically do that now, but I like to think that people who take the time to go to a polling station and in some cases wait in line to vote have actually done a little research on the candidates and are invested in the outcome.
Yeah, I have visions of the political equivalent of Boaty McBoatface being elected. There's something to be said for putting a modest barrier to vote in place (ie getting off your ass and taking 15 minutes out of your life).
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Originally Posted by fotze
If this day gets you riled up, you obviously aren't numb to the disappointment yet to be a real fan.
I think the big problem with this (and really most economic theories) is the human element. And that it starts to break down when it gets applied to entities that are economically massive.
So what now decides what is an appropriate punishment for unethical or dangerous business practices? Currently companies that commit fraud or pollute the environment receive what look like high value punishments (in the dozens and up to hundreds of millions of dollars) but are pretty unsubstantial when taking their profits into account. As long as pure profit is the sole motivator for a business, they will seek too (and in many ways are legally obligated to) maximize profit. That means if the punishment for shirking regulations is x, but the profits for doing something unsafely or whatever vs having routine checks is 2x, or even 1.000000001x, a company will choose the latter every time.
So the question is, would self-regulated insurance seek to punish these companies as harshly as necessary to curb the behavior? IMO the answer is no for the same reason as above. Those insurance companies are for profit business, and they make money by maximizing clients. They gain nothing by pricing people out of their plans or into bankruptcy. There is the same equation for them, is paying out the damages by company y less than the premiums I get from them and all others? Can I keep company y as a client and slightly raise premiums on everyone else without much of a fuss?
Maybe there would be some type of recourse the other businesses could take against someone needlessly raising premiums. But another problem with these types of free markets, as we are seeing now, some companies end up becoming giants and entire industries end up run by two or three companies. That would include the insurance industry here and end up with a scenario (not dissimilar to now) where premiums are largely the same across the board for similar plans and even discount brokers are actually run by the larger entities.
I will definitely acknowledge there is the potential for perverse incentive structures once the human element is factored in. But I also think this would be countered by the increase pressure of lawsuits from private watchdog groups. They are going to want (and now able) to sue to protect the interests they are trying to champion. Insurance companies only method of punishment would be increasing rates (which could be very substantial) if a company is acting against good practice. But at least this could be argued based on facts agreed upon in court (and not motivated by partisan politics)
The key to making sure premiums are reasonable and protections are adequate would be competition. I agree that there is the opportunity for massive insurance players to take up major market shares, but if each regulatory sector (environmental, labor, financial, ect..) is compartmentalized then smaller players could step into markets that the big companies have monopolized previously. Innovation in how to protect the sector will prevent this.
Example: Lets say a O&G company uses methane from their production to operate valves & pumps on remote wellsites. This is a case of fugitive emissions. Likely insurance companies will put limitations on how much can be released to protect a certain liability of those emissions causing a lawsuit. The big insurance companies all have the more or less the same "industry standard" for fugitive emission requirements. Seeing an opportunity a small insurance (or a big one trying to out compete the competition) offers a discount on premiums if they add Instrument air compressors to all of the sites. This way the emissions are no longer created thus the liability associated with it goes away. The savings can then be calculated and compared to the increased capital costs to install the IA compressor. This way we can incentivize good practices. Under current government regulations, a company that decides to operate in good practice gets no benefit from spending the capital cost upfront to prevent said emissions.
This model would have to be studied in detail with actual measurable numbers and values before it could ever be implemented. I would guess there would definitely be an increase of "incidents" in the short term after its implementation but I believe a truly free market would eventually be able to stabilize and eventually drop incident rates and damage rates by incentivizing ethical practices. Besides getting public support to drop ALL regulations (which will not be easy / nearly impossible) this would be the biggest roadblock to getting the system to work, people would get upset that its not working immediately and scrapping the program before it can come to more of a steady state operation.
The problems is corporations have money for lawyers, scientists and publicists to prove they were not a fault and therefore not liable.
Take leaded gasoline or smoking for example. To prove these companies were in fact poisoning people took Herculean effort.
Or on the other side could I sue every Carbon emitter for the damage they are doing to the environment or sue a seismic company for causing damage to the migration pattern of Caribou.
The problem is that the government needs to define public good. You can't leave it for companies or courts
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It definitely would, but I remain skeptical on whether or not it's a good idea. It would open the door to 'trolling' votes, or people voting for the sake of voting with no knowledge of the candidates. Sure, people can technically do that now, but I like to think that people who take the time to go to a polling station and in some cases wait in line to vote have actually done a little research on the candidates and are invested in the outcome.
I was thinking more along the lines of electronic methods to increase the speed at voting stations. Some type of electronic to speed up the process but manual process to have a trail to audit.
Just random ideas how it might look like:
Spoiler!
ie: Submitting a response online, then activating those responses at a polling station (wherever they are) using either a QR code or unique identifier code of sorts. Less issues with not enough ballots, faster response at polling stations, and even if someone spams votes online, someone actually has to be on the ground to activate those votes or they are considered spoiled ballots.
Voting on someone's behalf might become the new issue though.
Maybe the votes on the website could be opened. For instance let's say people start going online and see this:
Vote Z: Smith + Chu. The person receives a unique ID (not shown on website) to use at the station. When the person registers that vote at a station, a time stamp of that unique ID is stamped with a date and time on the website and the machines print out paper copies of the history at each voting station.
As for a last minute change in heart, maybe you have an option to change the vote. But there are questions asked when changing the vote and the screen + hands are recorded as a video (not person's face) showing the selection of a different "response" from the original sent online.
In some senses, you don't need to spend money to poll anymore. All the intended ballot responses are out there for all to see starting from advanced voting or earlier.
Votes are claimed using ID codes. Info is open for all to see to aid vote audits.
ID codes are not associated with addresses to ensure anonymity
Addresses are collected as a method to reduce voting fraud
Machines used reduce certain issues relating to lack of ballots and speed up process for tabulation and voting.
Unclaimed votes is information also useful to learning about voting
I will definitely acknowledge there is the potential for perverse incentive structures once the human element is factored in. But I also think this would be countered by the increase pressure of lawsuits from private watchdog groups.
Who are these groups? Are they above being lobbied by both industry and insurance? Who is paying them to be watch dogs? Who sues over environmental issues? A lot of times activist law is neither prosperous nor glamorous. And it fights against the interests of highly wealthy and powerful people.
They are going to want (and now able) to sue to protect the interests they are trying to champion. Insurance companies only method of punishment would be increasing rates (which could be very substantial) if a company is acting against good practice. But at least this could be argued based on facts agreed upon in court (and not motivated by partisan politics)
The key to making sure premiums are reasonable and protections are adequate would be competition. I agree that there is the opportunity for massive insurance players to take up major market shares, but if each regulatory sector (environmental, labor, financial, ect..) is compartmentalized then smaller players could step into markets that the big companies have monopolized previously. Innovation in how to protect the sector will prevent this.
Example: Lets say a O&G company uses methane from their production to operate valves & pumps on remote wellsites. This is a case of fugitive emissions. Likely insurance companies will put limitations on how much can be released to protect a certain liability of those emissions causing a lawsuit. The big insurance companies all have the more or less the same "industry standard" for fugitive emission requirements. Seeing an opportunity a small insurance (or a big one trying to out compete the competition) offers a discount on premiums if they add Instrument air compressors to all of the sites. This way the emissions are no longer created thus the liability associated with it goes away. The savings can then be calculated and compared to the increased capital costs to install the IA compressor. This way we can incentivize good practices.
In the case a claim is made, even after these compressors are added, how is this small company that specializes in very specific type of insurance going to payout a claim? The will require the backing of larger institutions.
Who regulates if they have the financial backing to payout such a claim?
Under current government regulations, a company that decides to operate in good practice gets no benefit from spending the capital cost upfront to prevent said emissions.
There are no tax incentives or insurance premium reductions for reducing liability currently? I'm not arguing the current regulatory methods are sound (I honestly don't know much about them), but I would have to assume that there incentives to operate business responsibly. The question again is it the proper method to curb behaviour? We would probably both agree it's not.
This model would have to be studied in detail with actual measurable numbers and values before it could ever be implemented. I would guess there would definitely be an increase of "incidents" in the short term after its implementation but I believe a truly free market would eventually be able to stabilize and eventually drop incident rates and damage rates by incentivizing ethical practices. Besides getting public support to drop ALL regulations (which will not be easy / nearly impossible) this would be the biggest roadblock to getting the system to work, people would get upset that its not working immediately and scrapping the program before it can come to more of a steady state operation.
I would argue a for-profit business will never incentivize itself to spending more money on self-regulation than is the absolute bear minimum required. Including doing things that are illegal purely because cost of punishment is less than profit. It flies the face of the principle of why things are illegal. Something needs to disincentivize this "cheat until your caught. And then just pay and keep cheating." mindset. Things are illegal because they go against the public good/morals, not because they cost too much.
Thoughts.
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The problems is corporations have money for lawyers, scientists and publicists to prove they were not a fault and therefore not liable.
Take leaded gasoline or smoking for example. To prove these companies were in fact poisoning people took Herculean effort.
Or on the other side could I sue every Carbon emitter for the damage they are doing to the environment or sue a seismic company for causing damage to the migration pattern of Caribou.
The problem is that the government needs to define public good. You can't leave it for companies or courts
Doesnt stop people from filing class action lawsuits, forming Environmental groups or PAC's. If people are so concerned about a problem they could elect a government that could take these companies to court (but would ultimately be decided by the courts - not government). This way there would be more ways and methods to hold companies to the values held by a given jurisdiction.
In the case of the carbon emitters you could try and sue every carbon emitter but a court would not let you goto court for a small player as it would be a waste of time. A certain threshold of damages would be required.
Public good would be defined in the acts / laws that implement the privatization of regulation. They would have to be defined in a way that is general enough to allow for adequate protection but not too general so you can sue over anything. Some examples could be (subject to rewording):
- Air quality must be maintained so that it has no adverse effects on local populations
- A potable Water quality must be maintained
This would be a very hard aspect to get "right" yes, but the ideas in this thread are exactly that, things that go against the norm and could be very hard to implement.
But people aren't concerned about air quality of global warming in general already now you want individuals to form a class action suit and sue in court where you would need an uneducated judge or jury to interpret scientific evidence to assign blame to a single company and fine them for the damages cause to a person on an island in the Caribbean who was adversely affected by rising water level by emissions emitted 5 years before.
Your proposal doesn't work beyond the most immediate affects that impact the bottom line this year
Your system brakes because the profit incentive makes externalizimg costs and pushing them into the future make sense. You need regulation and punishment to balance the incentives
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Doesnt stop people from filing class action lawsuits, forming Environmental groups or PAC's. If people are so concerned about a problem they could elect a government that could take these companies to court (but would ultimately be decided by the courts - not government). This way there would be more ways and methods to hold companies to the values held by a given jurisdiction.
In the case of the carbon emitters you could try and sue every carbon emitter but a court would not let you goto court for a small player as it would be a waste of time. A certain threshold of damages would be required.
Public good would be defined in the acts / laws that implement the privatization of regulation. They would have to be defined in a way that is general enough to allow for adequate protection but not too general so you can sue over anything. Some examples could be (subject to rewording): - Air quality must be maintained so that it has no adverse effects on local populations
- A potable Water quality must be maintained
This would be a very hard aspect to get "right" yes, but the ideas in this thread are exactly that, things that go against the norm and could be very hard to implement.
Yes but can't you see how these self-regulated industries would have it in their best interest to have these standards be as low as possible?
Multimillion-billion dollar lawsuits forced upon them by only the most vigorous of opponents haven't cubed this behaviour. You're talking about industries en-masse agreeing to hold themselves to stricter regulations and punishment than is currently being done by outside forces. Outside forces they routinely spend absurd amounts of money to combat.
Pay politicians way more. Their salaries should compete with senior leader salaries at large companies so that we can attract the most talented leaders.
There just aren't enough die hard public service hill rats like Steven Harper who forgo the higher salaries and anonymity of private service to get involved at a young age.
Most importantly, this would hopefully reduce the current trend of our politicians first going to get rich, then later seeking the power of politics and bringing with them the influences of their elite circles. That's one of the biggest complaints about democracy today.
The idea isn't to make politics about something to get rich with, it's about getting the smart people who were going to be rich anyway involved young.
Spitballing here, but:
Council = $500K/yr
Mayor = $1M/yr
MLA = $800K/yr
Premier = $2M/yr
MP = $1M/yr
PM = $5M/yr
Who are these groups? Are they above being lobbied by both industry and insurance? Who is paying them to be watch dogs? Who sues over environmental issues? A lot of times activist law is neither prosperous nor glamorous. And it fights against the interests of highly wealthy and powerful people.
Any organization would be lobbied by industry and insurance, this isn't really different from it is now, at least now outcomes (ie damages & premiums) would be tied to actualities and not what a government entity decides to "give up" in order to win support. There are tonnes of environmental organizations that would sue (ie greenpeace / Sierra Club / ect..) They rely on big money and small donations, again nothing different. Public support for causes has never had higher engagement than it does now due to social media and the internet.
Quote:
Originally Posted by MattyC
In the case a claim is made, even after these compressors are added, how is this small company that specializes in very specific type of insurance going to payout a claim? The will require the backing of larger institutions.
Who regulates if they have the financial backing to payout such a claim?
More Insurance companies! JK.... kinda. Insurance companies operate under certain regulation now so they need to be able to prove the have enough capital to cover their liabilities. In a purely privatized regulatory model a new mechanism to regulate the insurance companies would be needed. Or alternatively it is the aspect of government regulation left (although i dont think the system would be able to properly operate in the longer term if any government is involved)
Quote:
Originally Posted by MattyC
There are no tax incentives or insurance premium reductions for reducing liability currently? I'm not arguing the current regulatory methods are sound (I honestly don't know much about them), but I would have to assume that there incentives to operate business responsibly. The question again is it the proper method to curb behaviour? We would probably both agree it's not.
There are some yes, and i was only giving a VERY specific example. But currently in AB only Large emission producers (see SGER) pay for incremental increases in emissions. So small producers are basically said stay under X amount and you are good no penalty, but its not ZERO. Any mechanism that financially incentivizes companies to move to ZERO is better than just saying stay under this so you wont get in trouble.
We can agree the current regulatory model is not the best, but it has proven at a minimum as moderately effective.
Quote:
Originally Posted by MattyC
I would argue a for-profit business will never incentivize itself to spending more money on self-regulation than is the absolute bear minimum required. Including doing things that are illegal purely because cost of punishment is less than profit. It flies the face of the principle of why things are illegal. Something needs to disincentivize this "cheat until your caught. And then just pay and keep cheating." mindset. Things are illegal because they go against the public good/morals, not because they cost too much.
I disagree especially when it comes to environmental. Avoiding a PR nightmare (which is typically associated with any environmental issue) helps stockholders. By putting the onus on the public to sue for bad practices ensures companies operate in a fashion that best serves the people, not the government. I also dont believe that ALL for-profits will never spend more than they "have to". Will some? Yes absolutely, but these wont be large players (again going back to PR and stockholders), and will likely have to pay higher premiums making them less competitive and phasing them out of the industry. I have plenty of clients that purposely go above and beyond regulation because they know its good practice and will save them headaches in the future.
But people aren't concerned about air quality of global warming in general already now you want individuals to form a class action suit and sue in court where you would need an uneducated judge or jury to interpret scientific evidence to assign blame to a single company and fine them for the damages cause to a person on an island in the Caribbean who was adversely affected by rising water level by emissions emitted 5 years before.
Your proposal doesn't work beyond the most immediate affects that impact the bottom line this year
Your system brakes because the profit incentive makes externalizimg costs and pushing them into the future make sense. You need regulation and punishment to balance the incentives
I would say today's global concern for climate change is a perfect example of people caring about something very general.
It definetly goes beyond the bottom line of one year. There are not many capital projects of significance that have paybacks in less than a years time. This would involve forecasting years ahead of potential premium savings based on capital investment.
Increasing premiums are very good way of punishing companies than operate in a bad manner. If they want to make the most amount of money they have the incentive to innovate and lower their impact.
