Quote:
Originally Posted by GoinAllTheWay
From that article:
That just makes me so sad.
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It is what it is.
The truth of the matter is that we were trying to "punch" WAY "above our weight" as a nation during this period and given the other pressing burdens on the DND's budget, the Arrow was an extravagance that the nation could not afford...period. When the axe fell at Malton, Canada was facing some other major procurement issues. Pre-eminent among these was the re-equipment of the 9 day fighter (Sabre5/6) and 3 all weather (CF-100 MkV) fighter squadrons based in Europe, as part of our NATO commitment. Funds had already been recently committed to a large naval construction program; huge funds were also being spent on infrastructure at the time.
The problem with the Arrow was that it was perfect for us, the US, and the USSR. The US already had a "Billion Dollar Baby" (boondoggle) of their own, the "1954 Interceptor"
, (i.e. F-106). Selling CF-105's to the Russians wasn't in the cards.
So what it comes down to is the cold hard truth that despite the fact that we'd blown a ton of money getting the program to the point it was, we still had not flown an aircraft with the indigenous (Iroquois) engines, the automated (SAGE integrated) weapons system was still years from IOC and we had no customers to help defer the massive R&D funds that had got us this far into it. Avro was quick to jump on the "Cook-Craigie" theory (all the rage south of the border at the time) whereby hand built prototypes were to be dispensed with, in favor of building the tooling and production jigs and building "pre-production" aircraft...then tweaking the jigging as required. This sucked up a ton of money and yes, the production line was ready to commence full series production at the time of cancellation, but this cost a pile of upfront money and rubbed some "people" the wrong way...some of these in the upper levels of RCAF, truth be told.
The bird was a significant achievement but as it sat on the tarmac on that fatal day...it was still very much a work in progress. Far from the operational interceptor that (we thought) we needed.
Convair's F-106 is illustrative of what would still be required if we wanted to get the CF-105 from where it was, into frontline service with the RCAF/NORAD. The USAF threw bucketloads of money at the MX-201/MX-1179 programmes (F-106 and MA-1 weapons system) and eventually it was produced...300 units in total, cut from an initial "requirement", on the order of ~2000.
The F-106 finally reached IOC, almost ten years late, billions over budget and with so many bugs (being "fixed" on the assembly line) that some 16 plane Squadrons had as many as five (significantly) different versions sitting on the same flight line. The Republic F-105 Thunderchief was pretty much the same story.
FWIW, when the "plug" was "pulled" the "ASTRA" weapons system (being developed by the Canadian subsidiary of RCA) was on the verge of entering litigation (this was being filed by Hughes) for propriortory patent infringements. This system eventually matured and surfaced on the F-14 Tomcat...in the early '70's.
Bottom line? It all looks good with 50 years of hindsight; the people who
actually made the decision to "pull the plug" (and it WASN'T Diefenbaker) on our "Ultimate Interceptor" knew a heck of a lot more about the
extant situation than anyone sitting here lamenting the "demise" of Canada's aviation industry could ever hope to.
The CF-101 did a fine job for our NORAD needs.
The F-101B
was the (de facto) "Ultimate Interceptor" for the USAF's ADC during the first half of the 1960's.
The F-101A/C was the "stand in" for the (delayed) F-105, in the role of low level penetration (nuclear) fighter-bomber at the same time.
Damned fine machine that Voodoo.
Bomarc...on the other hand?
Cheers, Ron
)
