Quote:
Originally Posted by FLAME ENVY
Dramatic much? Did you know there is a simple memory procedure for runaway trim which the Lion Air crew did not wholly execute? They only had to utilize the trim cut-off switches, it appears they did not. In fact, the procedure for runaway trim is pretty much the same for all Boeing airframes since the 707 debuted, including the military heavies. Had the crew followed proper procedure for a runaway trim situation, this crash likely wouldn’t have occurred. If the crew knew nothing of MCAS, than why did they not follow procedure for runaway trim when their aircraft continually went nose down uncommanded? Previous Lion Air crews were able to rectify the same situation on the same hull that crashed, this crew did not. Let’s not forget the MCAS system was doing its job based on the erroneous AoA data, Lion Air maintenance had already replaced the AoA indicator which was serving the incorrect data. If the problem persisted with the indicator, this aircraft should have not been airworthy.
Regardless of MCAS being involved, the procedure for runaway trim does not change.
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I guess one question would be - is a MCAS malfunction easily identifiable as a case of runaway trim? Certainly the one Lion Air crew successfully identified that (well technically, it has been reported that it was an off-duty pilot who identified the correct solution). My understanding is that the MCAS would activate intermittently - does that make it different than other runaway trim scenarios that the pilots should definitely have been trained to identify?