Quote:
Originally Posted by btimbit
You mention missiles but I don't really think that's much of a factor, as I know you know, and any armoured soldier will tell you, any decent tank will be able to detect missile launches and send a return round long before that slow moving TOW reaches it's target.
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Maybe. If the crew isn't buttoned up, they have a better chance of detecting an incoming missile and responding accordingly. If not...
There is a dozen or so Turk Leopard IIs in northern Syria rusting away - taken out by TOW and other ATGMs.
Quote:
Originally Posted by btimbit
Obviously the issue here is going to be doctrine, which, as always, is Russia's weak point. If they couldn't properly support their tanks before, what reason do we have to believe that that's going to change now, no matter how old the equipment they're fielding? Their gear has never been the issue with the Russians, it's how they use it
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OK, doctrine. Since we are talking about the use of tanks on the battlefield, let's rewind to seven years ago. On 8 Oct 15, Syrian forces launched an attack against the Jihadist forces at the Latamin bridgehead using an armoured fist plan developed by their Russian advisors. They concentrated their armoured forces on the Hama plains with an aim to crush the enemy with one punch. Unfortunately, their plan did not work and the Jihadists routed the Syrian armour using TOW and other ATGM weapons. Even then it was evident the Soviet dogma of "Tank wedges to the English Channel" was outdated.
The Syrians in subsequent years (largely without Russian participation) rethought the meaning of the tank on the battlefield and began to act effectively. In open spaces, the infantry platoon received a tank under its command. The infantrymen went forward, identified enemy firing points and called in their armor to destroy them. The soldiers went ahead of the tanks, which significantly reduced the loss of vehicles on the plains.
In the cities, tactics changed. Each tank had its own “gunner” operating outside of the tank. He operated a drone over a tank in order to provide a broader picture of the battlefield. Such interaction made it possible to break through the enemy's fortifications even in close Arab buildings.
The Syrian experience taught the Russians nothing and, so, fast forward to 24 Feb 22, Russian armoured columns went forward, with practically no connection with the infantrymen. The losses on those days can be judged by numerous AFU videos.
Now the Russian army has to gnaw through enemy defenses in depth, so the Russians had to rethink the meaning and use of the tank on the battlefield because throwing armoured fists forward on today's battlefield does not work.
Izyum. The Russians tried to capture Kamenka with a tank assault. As a result, this tactic completely failed and the special forces cleared the village on foot. The Wagnerians also advanced in small groups of infantry. Neither Popasnaya nor Soledar were taken head-on by a tank attack.
So what should be done? Firstly, abandon the tactics of tank breakthroughs. Secondly, each tank must be assigned a ground gunner. He must ensure coordination between the tank and the infantry. Thirdly, each tank must have its own drone. Finally, artillery. Better have lots of it. And layered air defence.
Now, has NATO been paying attention?