[FlameOn]

Freedom House has an in depth article on how the CCP under Xi has been ramping up it's international media influence by conducting disinformation campaigns through official media channels, purchases of foreign media assets, infiltration of other countries media infrastructure, and strong arm tactics of media controlled by the Chinese diaspora. Definitely worth a read through for those interested.


Some highlights

The past three years have been marked by an acceleration of this process and the emergence of more new tactics. It is notable that during the same period, Xi further consolidated his power at the 19th Communist Party Congress in October 2017 and won approval for constitutional amendments that removed presidential term limits in March 2018. The following changes in Beijing’s overseas media activities since early 2017 deserve special scrutiny:

• Russian-style social media disinformation campaigns and efforts to manipulate search results on global online platforms have been attributed to China-based perpetrators.
  
• Tactics that were once used primarily to co-opt Chinese diaspora media and suppress critical coverage in overseas Chinese-language publications are now being applied—with some effect—to local mainstream media in various countries.
  
• Beijing is gaining influence over crucial parts of some countries’ information infrastructure, as Chinese technology firms with close ties to the CCP build or acquire content-dissemination platforms used by tens of millions of foreign news consumers.
  
• There is evidence that Chinese-owned social media platforms and digital television providers in multiple regions have engaged in politicized content manipulation to favor pro-Beijing narratives.
  
• Chinese officials are making a more explicit effort to present China as a model for other countries, and they are taking concrete steps to encourage emulation through trainings for foreign personnel and technology transfers to foreign state-owned media outlets.

The goals of the CCP’s global media influence

The CCP’s global media influence campaigns target both overseas Chinese and non-Chinese audiences. They have traditionally been designed to accomplish three primary aims, which are evident from official statements, analysis of state media content, and particular incidents involving CCP critics:

• to promote a positive view of China and of the CCP’s authoritarian regime;
  
• to encourage foreign investment in China and openness to Chinese investment and strategic engagement abroad; and
  
• to marginalize, demonize, or entirely suppress anti-CCP voices, incisive political commentary, and exposés that present the Chinese government and its leaders in a negative light.
  
• For the overseas Chinese audience, programming and news coverage indicate the additional goal of promoting nationalistic sentiment and Taiwan’s reunification with the mainland.

How the CCP promotes its favored content and narratives abroad

The CCP employs a variety of methods to reach global audiences with approved content. These include building up the overseas capacity and presence of official state media, insinuating official views into foreign mainstream media, cultivating foreign outlets that can produce their own favorable content, acquiring or establishing new outlets, and conducting disinformation campaigns on global social media platforms.

• Expanding the global capacity and presence of official state media
• Insinuating official views into foreign mainstream media
• Cultivating foreign media that can produce their own favorable content
• Purchasing foreign media outlets and establishing new networks
• Conducting disinformation campaigns on global social media platforms

How the CCP suppresses critical news coverage abroad


Since coming to power in 1949, the CCP has constructed a multilayered system for censoring unwanted news and stifling dissent within China. Over the past three decades, aspects of this domestic apparatus have been adapted to impose some censorship on media outlets based outside the country. As with its propaganda efforts, the regime’s transnational censorship operation uses a combination of overt and covert methods.

Ten years ago, the CCP’s censorship of external media appeared to focus mainly on international outlets operating within China and Chinese-language outlets abroad, including those in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Efforts to influence the mainstream media in Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia, and elsewhere was generally limited to propaganda—the promotion of Chinese state media content and narratives—rather than the suppression of critical local coverage.

But this appears be changing, particularly as Chinese entities increase their investments in other countries and grow more sensitive to local debates about China’s role. Chinese officials have begun to use economic leverage to silence negative reporting or commentary in local- language media with greater frequency.

The CCP’s efforts in this regard can be grouped into four main categories:

• Direct action by Chinese government representatives
• Economic “carrots” and “sticks” to encourage self-censorship by media owners
• Indirect pressure applied via proxies
• Cyberattacks, physical assaults, and online verbal abuse

Controlling content delivery systems outside China
Over the past decade, Chinese companies have become increasingly active in building information infrastructure and content delivery systems abroad. Although privately owned, Chinese technology giants like Huawei and Tencent retain close ties with the Chinese government and security services, routinely providing censorship and surveillance assistance to the party-state within China.[136] The international expansion of such companies has received the explicit blessing of the CCP. For example, in a 2017 essay in the authoritative party journal Qiushi on China’s strategy for becoming a “cyber superpower,” the authors cited the objective of enhancing “the global influence of internet companies like Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, [and] Huawei.”[137]

As these and other Chinese companies gain more influence and control over the avenues of content transmission and dissemination, they open the door to a whole new level of influence. CCP-friendly gatekeepers are now positioned to manage information flows in other countries. Analyst Peter Mattis has argued that the CCP’s approach over the past decade has been at least as much about controlling the medium as about controlling the message: “This way they can essentially have a monopoly on the information environment.… That makes it easier for their narratives to be received and accepted.”[138]

There is already evidence of Chinese companies using their control over dissemination channels to create advantages for Chinese state media or to suppress information deemed undesirable by Beijing. But even where this potential has not yet been activated, the foundations are being laid to facilitate future manipulation.

Chinese firms are pursuing the CCP’s goals on this front in three crucial ways: by leading transitions from analog to digital television broadcasting, by expanding the reach of Chinese social media platforms, and by seizing international market share for Chinese mobile devices.

• Becoming a leading force in digital television around the world
• Expanding global adoption of Chinese social media platforms
• Gaining worldwide market share for Chinese mobile devices
• Cyberattacks, physical assaults, and online verbal abuse

https://freedomhouse.org/report/spec...fluence-abroad