Quote:
Originally Posted by Firebot
40 seconds...in the hands of Boeing test pilots knowing to expect an error who would be able to react within those 40 seconds.
In other words, a well trained crew knowing about the MCAS and testing for the scenario would have had 40 seconds or less to disable the problem after noticing it, versus a crew that had no idea the system even existed because it was not disclosed or trained on. Boeing built a system that actively was trying to crash a fricking plane if not countered within 40 seconds, and decided not to tell anyone about it to save on cost.
A pilot taking a sip of coffee and a few seconds of inattention on a 6 hour flight could be enough to cause a plane to crash. And you have to remember to turn off 3 specific switches, after identifying the problem, within the seconds you have left or you die.
And this is the Lion Air situation, we still don't know all the details of the Ethopian Air crash, where the pilots did know about MCAS at that point. That 40 seconds for Lion Air may have been 15 seconds for Ethiopian Air due to different conditions. It crashed much sooner than Lion Air.
Lion Air pilots hit the switch over 24 times while scrambling through the manual until they eventually lost control (and they would have no idea of a 40 second counter of course).
This is like pressing the button from Lost, Boeing edition
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Dramatic much? Did you know there is a simple memory procedure for runaway trim which the Lion Air crew did not wholly execute? They only had to utilize the trim cut-off switches, it appears they did not. In fact, the procedure for runaway trim is pretty much the same for all Boeing airframes since the 707 debuted, including the military heavies. Had the crew followed proper procedure for a runaway trim situation, this crash likely wouldn’t have occurred. If the crew knew nothing of MCAS, than why did they not follow procedure for runaway trim when their aircraft continually went nose down uncommanded? Previous Lion Air crews were able to rectify the same situation on the same hull that crashed, this crew did not. Let’s not forget the MCAS system was doing its job based on the erroneous AoA data, Lion Air maintenance had already replaced the AoA indicator which was serving the incorrect data. If the problem persisted with the indicator, this aircraft should have not been airworthy.
Regardless of MCAS being involved, the procedure for runaway trim does not change.