[Flash Walken]

Originally Posted by CliffFletcher

Turkey joined NATO in 1952. And for most of the history of NATO, it was far more likely that a 20 year old Turk would die fighting to defend the alliance than a Canadian, seeing as Turkey has conscription and shared a land border with the USSR.

Which will be somewhat ironic if NATO dissolves having only used article six once; in defense of the US.

Meanwhile in Europe, attitudes towards nukes are changing:

2007

Seeing as they were discussing the benefits of all things atomic, the French president continued, he had another suggestion as well: Because the French nuclear umbrella protected France’s neighbors as well as La Grande Nation itself, perhaps the Germans would consider taking a political stake in the French atomic arsenal?

Both the chancellor and her foreign minister were speechless. The idea of possessing nuclear weapons is taboo in Germany. Sarzoky’s predecessor Jacques Chirac cautiously brought up the issue 12 years ago, but he quickly realized it was pointless to pursue it.

Now

Given the country’s long-term support of nuclear disarmament, a debate about a possible German nuclear deterrent is virtually unprecedented. So far, these voices represent an extreme minority view—currently, neither the government nor the vast majority of German experts is even considering the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons—but with continued uncertainty about Trump’s commitment to Europe, this could change during the coming years.

THE PRO-NUCLEAR ARGUMENTS

Just three days before the U.S. elections, an op-ed in Germany’s largest left-leaning news outlet, Spiegel Online, mused about the possibility of Germany pursuing its own nuclear weapons if NATO were to break up in the aftermath of a Trump administration’s withdrawal from the alliance.

Two weeks later, Reuters quoted Roderich Kiesewetter, a senior member of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union and a high-ranking member of the Bundestag (national parliament), saying that “if the United States no longer wants to provide this [nuclear] guarantee, Europe still needs nuclear protection for deterrent purposes.” Given Trump’s earlier statements, Kiesewetter continued, “Europe must start planning for its own security in case the Americans sharply raise the cost of defending the continent, or if they decide to leave completely.” His suggestion: a Franco-British nuclear umbrella for Europe, financed through a joint European military budget. Under such a scheme, Germany would have to contribute a large amount to the overall costs of such a European deterrent. Further clarifying his remarks, Kiesewetter later pointed out that Europe does not need additional nuclear powers.

On November 28, Germany’s most influential conservative newspaper, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, opened with an op-ed by one of its publishers, Berthold Kohler, preparing Germans for “the unthinkable.” Continued Russian and Chinese attempts to expand their spheres of influence, coupled with a possible retreat of the United States, would amount to a “continental shift,” the author argued. According to Kohler, the stern implications for Berlin, which for many years relied on the approach of “Frieden schaffen ohne Waffen” (“build peace without weapons”), would be obvious: if Germany wants to successfully bargain with the Kremlin, he implies, it has to be able to credibly defend its allies (which is an interesting hint at the changed power relations in Europe). Kohler concludes that this could mean increased defense spending, a return to conscription, the drawing of red lines, and an indigenous nuclear deterrent. He is quick to insinuate that the French and British arsenals are currently “too weak” to take on Russia and China.