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Originally Posted by CaptainCrunch
I think you're throwing a lot of confusion into the Al Qaeda concept. Its not really a terrorist group, its a bunch of loosely affiliated groups with different aims and goals. That's why you see groups in Asia that are Al-Qaeda affiliated that are far more psychotic then the ones in the middle east for exampe
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That's a fair simplification, but in the end I think it's important to realize that simplifications only go so far. You can't actually DO much based on simplifications. Or have an informed opinion on policies based on that level of simplification. Well okay you can, but you'll inevitably go wrong very often.
IMO it's often better that people admit they can't get a good grip on something complicated than it is to try simplify it to a point where they can.
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The original concept with Bin Laden was that Al Qaeda was almost like a phone book of evil that could share resources, submit plans for terrorist activities and receive funding and material support. Bin Laden dreamed of himself not as a central authority that told these groups what to do, but would be able to advise and coordinate activities by different groups by offering or withholding funds and material aid or expertise. But the groups themselves would pick their own targets and plan their own ops and define their own end games.
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Yes, but you're leaving out some pretty huge bits there. Bin Laden had a vision of co-operating forces fighting against "evil" (mainly US influence) in multiple fronts all around the world. Essentially "think global, act local" applied to terrorism. They're only supposed to be "a phonebook of evil" for Islamist fighters and likeminded groups fighting "the same kinds of enemies".
Of course the enemy is very vaguely defined and I'm sure those principles get very murky when you start applying them in practice, especially outside the Middle-East. Still, most Al-Qaeda affiliates can be described (from a certain angle) as "fighting against the tyrannical Western forces and their puppets".
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The only reason why ISIS and Al-Qaeda are separate isn't because Al-Qaeda isn't as radical, or they've suddenly become quasi good guys. But because their alliance broke up because of a perceived slight caused by the leadership of the local Al-Qaeda groups feeling slighted and dis-respected by the ISIL leaders.
I read an article where a Al-Qaeda in Iraq leader was bemoaning that ISIS and them were fighting because what was basically a family squabble over levels of respect.
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That's a good addition, but then again as you said "an Al-Qaeda leader in Iraq" can mostly speak for himself. There are others who see more fundamental differences. Especially the groups that are only very loosely affiliated to Al-Qaeda.
Also, I don't believe alliances ever really break apart purely on such grounds. Perceived slights can easily be one big reason and even more easily they can bring things to a breaking point, but there's usually plenty of tension behind the scenes.
(Also, I would certainly not describe Al-Qaeda as "quasi good guys", I hope that wasn't the impression. They're just not as bad as ISIS/ISIL. Which really isn't much.)