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Originally Posted by Itse
Fair view if they were fired by his allies. If they were fired by his enemis, then I don't think that's fair. If someone comes and takes the thing you're trying to protect by force and you try to protect it and fail, I don't think you're responsible for what happens after that.
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I'm not sure I agree with this. The thinking is that if you possess certain types of weapons - mostly unconventional weapons - then you have a greater responsibility to ensure that they are secure. One of the biggest threats to international peace and security was the break up of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The fear was that weapons, primarily nuclear weapons, in both Russia and some former Soviet Republics, were in danger of falling into the wrong hands. Billions of dollars of western money went into programs like Cooperative Threat Reduction (based on the US legislation promoted by Senators Nunn and Lugar). CTR was hugely influential and successful in helping the Russians secure their arsenal. Had a rogue state or sub-state terrorist group got their paws on some old Soviet nuclear hardware, Russian culpability would have been clear and they would have been held to account. Simply saying that it wasn't their responsibility in what happens after the loss of such weapons would have been the worst thing they could have done outside of developing them in the first place. (see Graham Allison, et al.
Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy).
Quote:
Originally Posted by Itse
I also think way too much focus is given to these attacks, which seem to be mostly propaganda attacks anyway, and thus fed by media attention.
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The use of chemical weapons in many circles constitutes a war crime, one that is underpinned in international law (customary, humanitarian and treaty), regardless if Syria is party to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has been 25 years since the last CW attacks in a combat situation and the perpetrators of that crime were never expressly held to account for what they did. While very few have an appetite for war, many in the international arms control and disarmament community see this as a watershed moment - a new Halabja. Simply standing by and watching events unfold is providing
de facto legitimisation for future potential deliberate release of chemical agents. It is hoped that the mistakes made 25 years ago will not be repeated.