Hey Cap'n...gonna have to disagree (to a "degree') with this. The Wehrmacht "assimilated"
tens of thousands of "Hiwis" into servile jobs (ammo schlepers, litter bearers, logistical labor, vehicle maintenance), freeing up Germans for combat duties. It's an oft repeated myth that they could have waved a magic wand and turned these (compliant, but tactically inept) volunteers into valuable infantry assets. Despite the common perception...there's a lot to know before you can function as a coherent infantry unit. The Heer was already "maxed out" as to supplying the manpower they had on the line. The Hiwis allowed them to "re-muster" a pile of experienced men as infantry...this provided a (nominal) surge over and above the (draft) "class" of '24 who provided the infantry replacements for "Fall Blau" in 1942. Read Evan Mawdsley: "Thunder in the East", David Glantz/ Jonathan House: "When Titans Clashed" or John Erickson "The Road to Stalingrad".
The
scale of the conflict on the "Ostfront" is mind boggling. Imagine a "front" that starts at Coutts and ends at High Level...that's what we're talking about here. Call Calgary Kiev, Edmonton is Moscow and High Level becomes a major sea port like Vancouver (Leningrad). Murmansk and Archangel are up on the Arctic circle, where the NWT meets the Ocean.
Stick a big impenetrable swamp in the middle, stretching from about Sundre to Sylvan Lake.
Now conquer this...with 1940 tech.
As to the "scorched earth" thing? That was happening regardless; there was SFA that the Germans could do to prevent it. Army Group South was far too weak to take all their objectives "on the fly" and that's the only way that they're going to ever interdict the Soviets relocation efforts. The bulk of the Red Army were occupying blocking positions that shielded the Donbas region when Barbarossa kicked off...this was by design. When the Germans detached Guderian's 2nd Pz. Grp. from AGC to pocket 650K around Kiev, the withdrawl of industry was already 90% complete. They destroyed the military threat on the right flank but they conquered a hollow space...rich in resources, but devoid of the infrastructure needeed to extract them.
There was NO plunder of plant and resources in the wake of Barbarossa and this must have only served to re-enforce the hollow feeling of ultimate failure when Hitler took stock in December. They blew their "wad" and got little to nothing in return. The rest of the world was far more pessimistic about the Soviets situation than were the principals involved.
I would love to be inside Hitler's mind when he realized that he'd "shot his bolt" (right around the middle of August, when AGC had to halt for a "logistic pause" at Smolensk) and the "rotten house of cards" had failed to collapse.
"Oh sh*t..."
I'd prepared a huge post regarding the origins of "Hitler's War"; a "Cole's Notes" version of Adam Tooze's thesis (*the "interwebz" ate it).
Without understanding the Economics behind WWII..you will never understand the operational aspects. Most people focus on all the "sexy" finished weapons (see all the unmitigated "Panzer Love" on this thread), but without understanding how each of the combatants was financing their effort, an accurate appraisal of any "what if" is an exercise in speculation (at best).
It's been said that "amateurs study tactics; professionals study logistics"...
It goes without saying, that "logistics" start at the national exchequer; the guy who's figuring out how to make sure that the factories building all those "sexy weapons" have money to meet their payroll, and to "source" the raw materiels to stay in business.
WWII was war on a truly "industrial" scale...the likes of which will never be seen again. Nuclear weapons have obviated huge standing parks of aircraft, tanks and combat ready soldiers.
As such...it's an anachronism.
But the lessons are still relevant