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By 2001, the system was on high alert, and any policy maker who cared to look could see the CIA's concern. In February 2001, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet testified publicly that bin Laden and his organization posed 'the most immediate and serious threat; to the United States (Tenet 2001). Senior policy makers from both the Clinton and Bush administrations have testified that Tenet and other CIA officials warned that al Qaeda was planning lethal 'spectaculars' against Americans (Woodward 2002, p34). Louis Freeh, then FBI Director, testified on May 10, 2001 that a primary objective of al Qaeda 'is planning and carrying out large-scale, high-profile, high-casualty terrorist attacks against U.S. interests and citizens and those of our allies, worldwide' (Freeh 2001).

This strong strategic warning, however, was accompanied by a failure to learn clues about the specifics of the attack on the U.S. homeland, which led to a devastating failure of tactical warning. If policy makers listened to intelligence, they would know al Qaeda was coming, but they would not know when, where, or how.

Bryman, Daniel. "Strategic surprise and the September 11 attacks". Annual Review of Political Science. Vol 8 (June 2005): 145-170.