[fredr123]

Some offences in the Criminal Code have a minimum sentence. Others have a "starting point" for sentencing that is used as a guideline only. Manslaughter does not have a "starting point" for sentencing. The leading case in Alberta for sentencing in manslaughter cases is the 1995 Court of Appeal's decision in R v Laberge (not currently available online for free).

The relevant principles from that case were summarized in the sentencing decision in the Tschetter case (the cement truck driver). The entire Tschetter case is available here but the relevant points about sentencing principles, including the good stuff summarized from Laberge, follow:

Sentencing Principles and Objectives

[10] Parliament has codified the purpose and principles of sentencing in Section 718 of the Criminal Code.

PURPOSE.
718. The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims and to the community. 1995, c. 22, s. 6.

[11] Clearly the most important objectives in this type of case are general and specific deterrence and denunciation. Rehabilitation, although always important, is not a prime objective here.

OTHER SENTENCING PRINCIPLES.

718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, ...
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
(c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh;

(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. 1995, c. 22, s. 6; 1997, c. 23, s. 17; 2000, c. 12, s. 95(c); 2001, c. 41, s. 20; 2005, c. 32, s. 25.


Manslaughter Sentences

[12] The leading case in this province as to the approach to be taken for sentencing for manslaughter and indeed for all offences is R. v. Laberge reflex, (1995), 165 A.R. 375 (Alta. C.A.), where the Chief Justice, speaking for the majority, dealt with unlawful act manslaughter. In my view her comments are just as apposite for criminal negligence manslaughter and criminal negligence causing death.

[13] I quote the Chief Justice at paragraphs 14 -15 and 25 and 29:

Despite the fact that the Crown need not prove that an offender knew or intended that his conduct would put his victim at risk of injury in order to ground a conviction for manslaughter, whether this additional level of subjective intent has been established is important in assessing the offender’s blameworthiness for sentencing purposes. That is because our criminal justice system is based on the premise that, all other things being equal, the more an offender’s “intention” or “awareness” approaches the point that he knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that his unlawful act was not only likely to put the victim at risk of death, but indeed to cause death, the more culpable he is. Similarly, even absent proof of subjective mens rea, the more that the offender’s conduct, on an objective basis, approaches the point where it can be said that he ought to have known, had he proceeded reasonably, that his unlawful act would be likely to cause life-threatening injuries as opposed to simply putting the victim at risk of bodily injury, the more culpable he is. In other words, the offender’s moral blameworthiness and in turn the gravity of the offence are functions of the degree of fault.

In assessing the degree of objective mens rea, what the offender actually thought or intended at the time of the act is not material to the analysis. Provided that the offender possessed the necessary capacity to appreciate the risk flowing from his conduct, the proper inquiry is what should have been in the offender’s mind, had he acted reasonably.



All of these principles are designed to fulfil one of the fundamental purposes of sentencing: to preserve respect for the law. To accomplish this objective and to maintain the public’s commitment to abide by the rule of law, the courts must impose just sanctions on those who transgress the law. Doing so serves two purposes. First, it ensures that the public are not demoralized by seeing criminals commit crimes with impunity. That is what happens when the sentence imposed fails to reflect the gravity of the crime committed and the offender’s moral blameworthiness for it. Second, it deters potential wrongdoers by signalling to all that those who commit crimes will be held accountable for their actions. The law must educate as well as condemn.

It follows therefore that I do not accept the reasoning of those who argue that society has no legitimate stake in the sentencing process or that taking into account society’s values in sentencing is tantamount to an abdication of judicial responsibility.

The criminal law must reflect not only the concerns of the accused, but the concerns of the victim and, where the victim is killed, the concerns of society for the victim’s fate. Both go into the equation of justice. [per McLachlin, J. in Creighton, supra, at 57.]

Coincidentally, Tschetter's sentencing appeal is set to be heard on June 22.